Abstract. We focus on the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, when is an absolute constant. We present a simple algorithm for computing a -Nash equilibrium for any bimatrix game in strongly polynomial time and we next show how to extend this algorithm so as to obtain a (potentially stronger) parameterized approximation. Namely, we present an algorithm that computes a -Nash equilibrium, where λ is the minimum, among all Nash equilibria, expected payoff of either player. The suggested algorithm runs in time polynomial in the number of strategies available to the players.
Introduction
Motivation, Framework and Overview. Non-cooperative game theory has been extensively used in understanding the phenomena observed when decision makers interact. A game consists of a set of players, and, for each player, a set of strategies available to her as well as a payoff function mapping each strategy profile (i.e. each combination of strategies, one for each player) to a real number that captures the preferences of the player over the possible outcomes of the game. The most important solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is the notion of Nash equilibrium [11] : it is a strategy profile such that no player would have an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her strategy, i.e. no player could increase her payoff by choosing another strategy while the rest of the players persevered their strategies.
Despite the certain existence of such equilibria [11] , the problem of finding any Nash equilibrium even for games involving only two players has been recently proved to be complete in the PPAD (polynomial parity argument, directed version) class, introduced by Papadimitriou [12] . This fact emerged the computation of approximate Nash equilibria, also referred to as -Nash equilibria. An -Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no deviating player could achieve a payoff higher than the one that the specific profile gives her, plus .
In this work, we focus on the problem of approximating Nash equilibria of 2-player games. We propose simple and efficient algorithms for computing -Nash equilibria of such games, for sufficiently small absolute constants .
Previous Work. Nash [11] introduced the concept of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games and proved that any game possesses at least one such equilibrium; however, the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium used to be a wide open problem for several years. A well-known algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of a game with 2 players is the Lemke-Howson algorithm [9] , however it has exponential worst-case running time in the number of available pure strategies. A simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in 2-player random games was presented in [2] ; this algorithm always finds an equilibrium, and it runs in polynomial time with high probability.
Recently, Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou [5] showed that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is PPADcomplete; this result was later extended to games with 3 players [7] . Eventually, Chen and Deng [3] proved that the problem is PPAD-complete for bimatrix games in which each player has n available pure strategies.
In [10] , following similar techniques as in [1] , it was shown that, for any bimatrix game and for any constant > 0, there exists an -Nash equilibrium with only logarithmic support (in the number n of available pure strategies). This result directly yields a quasi-polynomial (n O(ln n) ) algorithm for computing such an approximate equilibrium.
In [4] it was shown that the problem of computing a 1 n Θ(1) -Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, and that bimatrix games are unlikely to have a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (unless PPAD ⊆ P). However, it was conjectured that it is unlikely that finding an -Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete when is an absolute constant.
Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [6] , independently to our work, show how to compute an 1/2-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game.
Our Results. In this work, we deal with the problem of computing an -Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, for some constant . We first present a simple algorithm for computing a Next we show how to extend this result so as to obtain a parameterized and potentially stronger approximation. More specifically, we present an algorithm that computes a 2+λ 4 -Nash equilibrium, where λ is the minimum, among all Nash equilibria, expected payoff of either player (Theorem 3). The suggested algorithm runs in time polynomial in the number of strategies available to the players.
Organization. In Section 2 we present the notation used throughout this paper, together with the definitions of bimatrix games, Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria, and we formally state and discuss the results of [4] and [10] on the problem of approximating Nash equilibria.
Our first algorithm for computing a 3 4 -Nash equilibrium is described in Section 3, while in Section 4 we present an extension of this algorithm that can give a stronger approximation. We conclude, in Section 5, with a discussion of our results and suggestions for further research.
Background

Notation
For an integer n, let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a n × 1 vector x we denote by x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n the components of x and by x T the transpose of x. For an n × m matrix A, we denote a i,j the element in the i-th row and j-th column of A. For an n × m matrix A and a constant c ∈ IR, we denote cA the n × m matrix resulting after multiplying each element of A by c. Let IP n be the set of all probability vectors in n dimensions, i.e.
Denote IR 
Bimatrix games
A noncooperative game Γ = N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N consists of (i) a finite set of players N , (ii) a nonempty finite set of pure strategies S i for each player i ∈ N and (iii) a payoff function u i : × i∈N S i → IR for each player i ∈ N . Bimatrix games [8, 9] are a special case of 2-player games (i.e. |N | = 2) such that the payoff functions can be described by two real n × m matrices A and B, where n = |S 1 | and m = |S 2 |. More specifically, the n rows of A, B represent the pure strategies of the first player (the row player ) and the m columns represent the pure strategies of the second player (the column player ). Then, when the row player chooses strategy i and the column player chooses strategy j, the former gets payoff a i,j while the latter gets payoff b i,j . Based on this observation, bimatrix games are denoted by Γ = A, B .
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ N is a probability distribution on the set of her pure strategies S i . In a bimatrix game Γ = A, B , a mixed strategy for the row player can be expressed as a probability vector x ∈ IP n while a mixed strategy for the column player can be expressed as a probability vector y ∈ IP m . When the row player chooses mixed strategy x and the column player chooses y, then the players get expected payoffs x T Ay (row player) and x T By (column player). The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are assigned non-zero probability.
Nash equilibria and -Nash equilibria
A Nash equilibrium [11] for a game Γ is a combination of (pure or mixed) strategies, one for each player, such that no player could increase her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. We formally give the definition of a Nash equilibrium and an -Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix game. Positively normalized bimatrix games. As pointed out in [4] , since the notion of -Nash equilibria is defined in the additive fashion, it is important to consider bimatrix games with normalized matrices so as to study their complexity. That is, the absolute value of each entry in the matrices is bounded, for example by 1, and there exists an entry in each matrix equal to 1.
[10] also used a similar normalization, which we adopt in this paper and describe it below. Consider the n × m bimatrix game Γ = A, B and let c, d be two arbitrary positive real constants. Suppose that (x,ỹ) is a Nash equilibrium for Γ and (x,ŷ) is an -Nash equilibrium for Γ . Let x and y be any strategy of the row and column player respectively. Now consider the game Γ = cA, dB . Then it holds that
Moreover,
Hence Γ and Γ have precisely the same set of Nash equilibria; furthermore, any -Nash equilibrium for Γ is a -Nash equilibrium for Γ (where = max{c, d}) and vice versa. 
c j y j and
Consider now the game
and similarly, for all y ∈ IP m ,
Also, for all x ∈ IP n it holds that 
Tractability of -Nash equilibria
Consider a bimatrix game Γ = A, B and let (x,ỹ) be a Nash equilibrium for Γ . Fix a positive integer k and assume that we form a multiset S 1 by sampling k times from the set of pure strategies of the row player, independently at random according to the distributionx. Similarly, assume we form a multiset S 2 by sampling k times from set of pure strategies of the column player, independently at random according to the distributionỹ. Letx be the mixed strategy for the row player that assigns probability 1/k to each member of S 1 and 0 to all other pure strategies, and letŷ be the mixed strategy for the column player that assigns probability 1/k to each member of S 2 and 0 to all other pure strategies. Clearly, if a pure strategy occurs α times in the multiset, then it is assigned probability α/k. Thenx andŷ are called k-uniform [10] Theorem 2 asserts that, unless PPAD ⊆ P, there exists no fully polynomial time approximation scheme for computing equilibria in bimatrix games. However, this does not rule out the existence of a polynomial approximation scheme for computing an -Nash equilibrium when is an absolute constant, or even when = Θ 1 poly(ln n) . Furthermore, as observed in [4] , if the problem of finding an -Nash equilibrium were PPAD-complete when is an absolute constant, then, due to Theorem 1, all PPAD problems would be solved in quasi-polynomial time, which is unlikely to be the case. 
-Nash equilibrium
In this section we present a straightforward method for computing a 
Similarly,x
Now observe that, for any (mixed) strategies x and y of the row and column player respectively,
and recall that
Thus (x,ŷ) is a 
A Parameterized Approximation
We now proceed in extending the technique used in the proof of Lemma 1 so as to obtain a parameterized, stronger approximation. Proof. Observe that, for any pair of strategies x, y of the row and column player respectively, it holds that x T Ay ∈ [0, 1] and x T By ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the following linear programs LP1 and LP2: Similarly, 
